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TAX PLANNING IN DIVORCE
by
John L. Bell, Jr.*
A S the incidence of divorce in this country continues to grow at an
alarming rate, the practicing attorney is experiencing a corre-
sponding increase in the portion of his time spent representing the
spouses involved. Traditionally the attorney has been concerned with
arbitrating reconciliation, establishing grounds for divorce, and work-
ing out the intricacies of child custody, support, and property settle-
ment. Very often little or no consideration is give by the attorneys or
the parties to the possible tax ramifications that follow the transfer of
property pursuant to the divorce decree. Yet, the tax law applies to
transfers of this type as surely as it does to any other transfer of pro-
perty. As in other transfers of property the problems can be simple
or complex, depending upon the facts involved and the planning
done prior to the transfer. Once a settlement agreement is reached
and the divorce decree entered, tax consequences will flow from their
enforcement. It will be discomforting, to say the least, for the client
to discover for the first time that he has entered into a taxable trans-
action. The attorney who recognizes the tax implications involved
in divorce, and who plans accordingly during the preliminary stages,
will be able to negotiate a settlement which avoids for his client tax
pitfalls attendant upon divorce.
I. PENDING DIVORCE
The initial tax problems in counseling a prospective divorcee are
encountered while the divorce action is pending. Prior to considering
a property settlement, complete information must be gathered con-
cerning assets, liabilities, and recent business dealings of the parties.
The attorney must insure that his client faces no tax debt for prior
years and that a proper return is filed for the current year. Demand
should be made on both parties to produce all financial records, W-2
statements, and tax returns for at least the past two years, or for the
period during which they have been separated, if longer than two
years. The attorney should verify not only that proper returns have
been filed but also that the taxes shown to be due have in fact been
paid.
Filing Returns and Liability for Tax The husband and wife,
though separated, have a choice of filing either joint or separate re-
* Attorney at Law, Beaumont, Texas; B.B.A., LL.B., University of Texas.
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turns for the taxable year prior to the granting of the divorce.' If
separate returns are filed, neither spouse is entitled to use the so-called
"head of household" rate to compute his tax, since the parties are still
husband and wife.' If a joint return is filed, both spouses become
jointly and severally liable for the tax shown by the return and for
any deficiencies thereafter assessed. ' The critical time for determining
whether a taxpayer is married or divorced, for tax purposes, is the
end of the taxable year." Hence, it will sometimes be wise to delay
the divorce until the following January, in order to gain the joint
return benefit for the year prior to the divorce.
Community property rules continue to apply until a decree of di-
vorce is entered even though the parties, having filed for divorce, live
apart during the taxable year.' If separate returns are filed, com-
munity income must be split equally regardless of which spouse
earned or received the money. Likewise, withholding tax and esti-
mated tax payments attributable to community income must be
equally divided between the parties.! Even if the husband received
almost all of the community income, he is only required to report
one-half. If he reports his wife's share as well, he may be entitled to a
refund, though a deficiency may be assessed against the wife.! The
wife is also required to report one-half of the community income,
even though she may actually have received only an insignificant
amount and has no access to her husband's tax information for pur-
poses of reporting.!
A client who is separated from an absent spouse, with no access to
that spouse's tax information, and who fails to file a proper income
tax return may be subject to the following consequences:
(1) Six per cent interest on the tax deficiency;'
-INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013 (a). The parties are still considered husband and wife
for federal income tax purposes until a final decree of divorce is entered. Treas. Reg. 5
1.6013-4(a) (1959); Rev. Rul. 57-368, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 896.
a INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1 (b)(2), (3)(B); Treas. Reg. S 1.1-2 (1956).
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013 (d) (3); Treas. Reg. S 1.6013-4(a)(2) (1959).4
Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-4(a)(2) (1959).
'William E. Grace, 10 T.C. 1 (1948); Kearse v. Kearse, 262 S.W. 561 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924), aff'd, 276 S.W. 690 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925). See also Hilley v. Hilley, 342 S.W.2d
565 (Tex. 1961); and TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4619 (1948) as to what constitutes
community property.
"Donald W. Smith, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 933 (1950). See also Gilmore v. United
States, 290 F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961), rev'd and remanded on another issue, 372 U.S. 39
(1963).
'Ella E. Harrold, 22 T.C. 625 (1954), rev'd on other grounds, 232 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir. 1956). The husband's refund cannot, without his consent, be offset against the wife's
deficiencies. Gilmore v. United States, supra note 6.
'Christine K. Hill, 32 T.C. 254 (1959).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6601 (a).
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(2) Six per cent penalty for failure to file a report of estimated
tax or for underpayment of the estimated tax;' °
(3) Five per cent per month delinquency penalty (not to exceed
twenty-five per cent) if no return is filed; 1
(4) Five per cent negligence penalty;"
(5) Fifty per cent civil fraud penalty (which, if applicable, elim-
inates the possibility of 3 and 4 above) ; and 3
(6) possible criminal penalties. 4
In order to avoid these consequences the client should file the best
possible return, showing the name of the absent spouse, his or her last
known address, and such information as the taxpayer can furnish
pertinent to the allocation of community income. The filing of a re-
turn will initiate the running of the three-year limitation period,
unless the taxpayer's income is understated twenty-five per cent or
more, in which case the limitation period is six years. 5 However, fail-
ure to file a return or the presence of fraud will indefinitely postpone
the commencement of the limitation period."
Where the other spouse is readily available to exchange tax infor-
mation, a separation agreement can be used most effectively. Parties
may agree to file a joint return for the taxable period prior to the
granting of the divorce and to provide for apportionment of the tax.
Such an agreement should cover the treatment of particular items of
income, deduction, and exemption, such as capital gains and losses,
alimony pendente lite, medical expenses for the children, and per-
sonal exemptions. The agreement should require each spouse to con-
tribute his or her share of the tax for estimated tax and final return
purposes, and to cooperate in the prosecution and collection of any re-
fund claims.
Provisions in a separation agreement or divorce decree regarding
the payment of tax are not binding on the Internal Revenue Service,"
and the community property of the parties remains liable for the tax
debt resulting from community income." Because the filing of a joint
return causes a client to be jointly and severally liable for the tax
"°INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6654.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 6651 (a).
"TINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 6653 (a).
'3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 6653 (b), (d).
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 7203.
" INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501 (a). (e).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6501(c)(1), (3).
'"Muriel Dodge Neeman, 13 T.C. 397 (1949); Frank R. Casey, 12 T.C. 224 (1949);
John H. Humbert, 24 B.T.A. 828 (1931). See also McMurrey v. Bryant, 281 S.W.2d 198




Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4620 (1948).
See also Comment, 16 Sw. L.J. 643 (1962).
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debt, in many instances the separate return will be preferable. Re-
gardless of the type of return filed, counsel should make every effort
to protect his client from contingent liability for tax claims."
Exemption for Children The exemption for children of separated
parents involved in a divorce action is a sensitive and often volatile
issue where separate returns are filed. The spouse contributing more
than fifty per cent to a child's support is entitled to claim the exemp-
tion." If all support comes from community property funds, each
spouse is deemed to have contributed exactly fifty per cent of the sup-
port of the child." However, the Service will not allow a single exemp-
tion to be divided between the parties, although it will allow either
spouse to take the entire exemption."2 Where more than one child is
involved and all support comes from community property funds, the
parties may divide among themselves the individual exemptions on
separate returns.2 Here again the separation agreement will be useful
in resolving potential problems.
Alimony Pendente Lite Texas does not recognize permanent ali-
mony;2 however, a court may award alimony pendente lite for the
support of the wife pending divorce.2 The payment of the alimony
pendente lite out of community property funds ordinarily will not
alter the tax picture." Nevertheless, it is possible to gain traditional
alimony treatment for these payments under sections 71 and 215 of
the code to the extent that such payments exceed the wife's share of
community property income for the year in which she receives them,7
or in the event that such payments are made out of the husband's
separate income. Should either of these situations exist, the pay-
ments will be deductible by the husband and taxable to the wife where
separate returns are filed.
II. DIVORCE AND SETTLEMENT
Property Settlement The effect of income tax on a property settle-
ment agreement is overlooked or ignored in many divorce cases.
19 One possible solution would be to require an escrow of the estimated tax liability to
assure payment of the tax.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 151 (e), 152(a).
1 I.T. 1275, I-1 CuM. BULL. 201 (1922).
"Ibid.
23Tnt. Rev. Ser. Pub. No. 17, at 146 (1965).
'4McElreath v. McElreath, 345 S.W.2d 722, 747 (Tex. 1961); McBride v. McBride,
256 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
5 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4637 (1948).
'Wren, Tax Problems Incident to Divorce and Property Settlement, 49 CALIF. L. REV.
665, 678 (1961).
'
7 Rev. Rul. 62-115, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 23.
2 See note 26 supra.
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However, the total economic impact of the agreement cannot be
properly evaluated unless consideration is given to the tax conse-
quences resulting therefrom. The amount of property received by a
spouse will be reduced by any income tax which that spouse is re-
quired to pay on gain resulting from the property division itself or
from subsequent sale of items received in the settlement. At present
there is much controversy and difference of opinion among tax prac-
titioners as to the income tax consequences resulting from a division of
community property. It is often difficult to ascertain whether a prop-
erty settlement agreement is a totally nontaxable division or a totally
taxable division, or whether it falls somewhere in between. Despite
this uncertainty, the divorce counsel must attempt to advise his client
of the probable tax consequences of any proposed settlement agree-
ment.
1. Nontaxable
Equal Division. An equal division of community property is treat-
ed as a partition, rather than a sale or exchange, and is not subject to
income tax."* Such a nontaxable, equal division of community prop-
erty may be accomplished in either of two ways:
(1) by actually partitioning each item of property so that the
spouses can then become tenants in common; or,
(2) by assigning specific items of property to each spouse so that
the total fair market value of all community property is di-
vided as equally as possible.
Rarely, if ever, is a partition of each item of property practical or
equitable, unless the community assets consist entirely of cash and
marketable securities. In a nontaxable division of the second type
seemingly the basis of a specific item of property in the hands of a
spouse after the divorce will be considered equal to its basis to the
community.' Thus, an equal division of community property based
on market value alone, though nontaxable, may not be advisable in-
asmuch as a subsequent disposition of the assets may involve a tax
consequence that destroys the equality of the division. The basis of
the property as well as its fair market value must be considered in
arriving at a fair division of the community estate.
Business and Debt Settlement. Payments made by a husband to his
29Clifford H. Wren, 34 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. 321 (1965); Osceola Heard
Davenport, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 856 (1953); Ann Y. Oliver, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403
(1949); C. C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908 (1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947); Frances R.
Walz, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935).3 9Swanson v. Wiseman, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 824 (W.D. Okla. 1961); Ann Y. Oliver,
8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 403 (1949).
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former wife in discharge of a business obligation or in repayment of a
loan may not be deducted by him and are not includable in the wife's
income.3 Likewise, a payment made in discharge of the wife's legal or
equitable separate property rights, where there has been commingling,
is an accounting to the wife of that which is already hers, and there-
fore is not taxable." The rules of tracing and reimbursement apply
in such situations. Payments of this nature over and above an equal
division of the community property will not affect the taxability of
the division.
Nontaxable Exchange. The deferral sections of the code, if appli-
cable, may be used to avoid the recognition of gain or loss even
though the property settlement otherwise would be a taxable division.
Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the nonrec-
ognition of gain or loss where property held for use in a trade or
business, or for investment, is exchanged for property of a like kind."
In this type of exchange, the parties acquire a substituted basis in the
asset received rather than the community basis of the asset.' Care
must be taken in drafting a property settlement agreement where such
an exchange is made to assure that the transaction will qualify.
2. Taxable
Unequal Division. When a property settlement agreement ceases
to be an equal partition or division of the community estate and be-
gins to take on the characteristics of a sale or exchange of property
between the parties, the Service takes the position that a taxable trans-
action has occurred."' The intent of the parties and the nature of the
property so passing are important factors in determining whether
the property settlement is taxable.' Major problems center around
the following types of property settlements:
(1) an unequal division of community property where the spouse
" Thorsness v. United States, 260 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1958); Rush v. United States, 4
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5853 (N.D. Ala. 1959). To qualify as alimony, the payments must be
made because of the family or marital relationship in recognition of the general obligation
of support. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (b) (4) (1957).
"Ibid. See also Norris v. Vaughn, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953), and Dakan
v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935), discussing the right of reimbursement
between the separate and community estates upon dissolution.
"See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 1034 (sale or exchange of principal residence),
5 1035 (exchange of insurance policies), 5 1036 (exchanges of stock for stock of same cor-
poration).
"T INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1031(d). See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031 (d)-I (1960).
"Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818
(1949); Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); C. C. Rouse, 6 T.C. 908
(1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).
" Osceola Heard Davenport, 12 CCH TAX CT. REP,. 856 (1953).
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receiving the larger share uses "outside" funds to equalize with
the spouse receiving the lesser share; and
(2) a truly unequal division of community property involving
no attempt to equalize the division from other sources.
Where the agreement calls for a transfer of the husband's separate
property to the wife, or where the husband makes a payment to her
and uses "outside" funds (borrowed funds or promissory notes), the
transaction assumes the appearance of a sale rather than a partition."
Where such a payment is made or an obligation is incurred to com-
pensate the spouse receiving the smaller share of the community
property, a taxable transaction has occurred."
Taxable property settlements most frequently result from situa-
tions where one asset, unsuitable for physical partition, comprises the
majority of the community estate. Frequently such asset is a business
enterprise, and the parties will enter into negotiations which take on
aspects of a bargain and sale. If the husband elects to purchase a por-
tion of the wife's share of the community property at a figure greater
than its basis, the wife will be taxed on her gain, which is measured
by taking one-half of the difference between the community basis
of the property transferred by her and the fair market value of the
property she receives in exchange."' Whether the gain will be treated
as ordinary income or capital gain will depend on the nature of the
property which she transfers. The husband's new basis in that in-
terest purchased from his wife will be its purchase price, but his one-
half of the community property will retain the community basis."'
There remains largely unanswered the question of the taxability of
a simple unequal division of community property between the
spouses. Property settlements in divorce are generally reached only
after considerable arm's-length bargaining in which both parties are
represented by counsel. Where an unequal division is caused by a dif-
ference of opinion concerning valuations, where one party is anxious
to obtain a divorce, at any cost, or where the unequal division is
intended to compensate an offended spouse, elements of a true bargain
and sale transaction are absent. In addition, such agreements are usual-
ly approved by the courts as being fair and equitable and such dec-
37 See note 35 supra.
"aLong v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818
(1949); Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943); Jessie Lee Edwards, 22
T.C. 65 (1954); Gordon R. Edwards, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 381 (1954); C. C. Rouse, 6
T.C. 908 (1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947). Where an obligation is incurred
represented by a promissory note, the imputed interest rules of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
483 may apply if the stated interest is less than 4%.
"Long v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818
(1949); Rouse v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1947).40 Ibid.
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rees are generally binding on third parties. Likewise, elements of
bargain and sale are absent where the judge, using the broad dis-
cretion given him under Texas divorce law, awards more than one-
half of the community property to one of the spouses.' Thus, in a
truly unequal settlement where no attempt is made at equalization,
the partition should be tax free, even though one of the spouses may
have gotten the better of the bargain.
Where a person has become obligated to pay a sum of money to
another and then transfers appreciated property in satisfaction of
such obligation, a sale occurs and capital gain is realized." Likewise,
the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Davis, a case
involving a taxpayer residing in a common law state, that the trans-
fer of appreciated property in satisfaction of inchoate rights of the
wife, including the support obligation, was a taxable transaction.
In such transfers, the amount of the gain realized by the husband-
transferor is the same as it would have been had the property been
sold for its fair market value. The wife, in such an instance, takes as
her basis in the property received the fair market value of the proper-
ty at the time of the transfer. In the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, the value of the marital rights surrendered is presumed to be
equal to the value of the property transferred.44
The applicability of the rules of the Davis case in community prop-
erty divorces is somewhat doubtful. However, some practitioners have
warned that the Service may try to apply Davis to situations involv-
ing an unequal division of community property. In Texas, the legal
duty of the husband to support his wife ceases upon the granting of
a final divorce, and a court has no power to enter a decree requiring
permanent alimony for her further support." The marital property
rights of a wife in our community property jurisdiction are vested
rights, as opposed to the inchoate rights of a wife in a common law
jurisdiction. Thus, the Texas property settlement is merely a division
between the spouses of their vested property rights, which should
preclude the applicability of the Davis rules.
Many practitioners have found fault with the present general rules
concerning the taxability of a division of community property upon
divorce and the post-divorce basis of the property in the hands of
the spouses. It has been suggested that the rules of sub-chapter K,
dealing with the dissolution of partnerships and requiring realloca-
"TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4638 (1948).
4'Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
43 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
" Ibid. This repudiates the earlier Sixth Circuit opinion in Commissioner v. Marshman,
279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960).
4 sSee note 24 supra.
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tion of basis, should apply upon the transfer of property pursuant to
a divorce decree.' There also has been advocated the adoption of sub-
stituted basis rules similar to those used in section 1031 transfers.4 7
Because of growing interest in this area the Section of Taxation of
the American Bar Association in 1964 formed a Committee on Do-
mestic Relations Tax Problems. After two years of study, this com-
mittee has recommended that legislation be enacted amending the
Internal Revenue Code to provide that transfers of property pursu-
ant to a divorce decree or property settlement agreement should not
give rise to the recognition of income or gain, or to a change in the
basis of the transferred property. The proposals of the committee are
designed to overrule the Davis case and to make clear the commit-
tee's belief that neither marriage nor divorce should be a taxable
event.48
Until Congress sees fit to adopt a coherent body of rules dealing
with the problems involved in transfers of property between spouses
pursuant to a divorce, it is incumbent upon counsel for each spouse
to make a careful examination and analysis of the code, regulations,
and cases in order to determine the tax consequences to his client ema-
nating from a proposed property settlement.
Losses Disallowed. Although gain is recognized upon a taxable
transfer between spouses, losses are not. Section 165 (c) of the code
precludes recognition of a loss resulting from disposition of property
held by the transferor for his own personal use.4 ' Much of the prop-
erty involved in a marital settlement agreement, such as household
furnishings, the family automobile, and the residence, is of such a
nature. An even greater barrier is section 267(a), which disallows
losses from sales or exchanges of property between members of a
family." The purpose of this section is to prevent an artificial loss
recognition wherein property is transferred but the economic benefit
remains within the family unit. It could be argued that transfers re-
sulting from a divorce fall outside the ambit of this policy and that
section 267 should not apply. However, it is advisable when dealing
with depreciated property in a divorce settlement to arrange for the
transfer of such property to occur subsequent to the granting of the
final divorce decree, i.e., after the parties have ceased to be husband
48 Brickner, Basis: Considerations in Planning a Nontaxable Division of Community Prop-
erty, 42 TAXES 560 (1964); Jackson, Community Property and Federal Taxes, 12 Sw. L.J.
1, 32 (1958).
4 Brickner, supra note 46. See also Burges, Property Settlement Incident to Divorce, 43
TAXES 80 (1965).
48 19 A.B.A., BULL. OF THE SECTION ON TAXATION 63 (1966).
4 See David R. Pulliam, 39 T.C. 883 (1963).
" See McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
[Vol. 20:726
TAX PLANNING IN DIVORCE
and wife. Another method of avoiding the applicability of section
267 involves the sale of the depreciated property to an outsider and
use of the proceeds of such a sale in settling property rights between
the spouses.
Depreciable Property. Under section 1239 a gain recognized upon a
sale or exchange between a husband and wife on property subject to
the depreciation allowance provided in section 167 is ordinary in-
come to the transferor-spouse.5' Therefore, where property of this
nature is involved, the settlement agreement should be drafted in
such a manner that the sale or exchange of this property occurs after
the final decree is entered, thus qualifying the transaction for capital
gain treatment.
3. Special Problems
Accounts Receivable. If the spouses are cash-basis taxpayers and
there are accounts receivable due to the community at the time of the
divorce, each spouse has a community interest in the receivables upon
collection. 2 If the property division is taxable and the receivables are
transferred to the husband, the wife is said to have sold or exchanged
her community interest and thus realizes ordinary income equal to
one-half of the value of the receivables at the time of the division. 3
In such case the husband obtains a new basis for the wife's commun-
ity interest in the receivables equal to one-half of the value of the
receivables at the time of the division." On the other hand, if the
division is nontaxable, the wife has made an assignment of income
and one-half of the amounts collected by the husband will be taxed
to the wife in the year of collection." Thus, where receivables are in-
volved, it is possible that tax consequences may follow a divorce even
though the property division is an equal, nontaxable division.
For ease in collecting, setting aside the receivables to one of the
spouses will usually prove to be the more desirable arrangement, ra-
ther than dividing the proceeds equally when received after the
divorce. If the receivables are set aside to the husband, the wife should
try to persuade the husband to agree to pay the tax resulting to the
wife on her one-half of the receivables.
Pension, Profit-Sharing, and Stock Bonus Plans. When vested in-
terests in pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plans are involved
"See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1239-1 (1966).
52Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Johnson v. United States, 135 F.2d 125 (9th
Cir. 1943).
" Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1937); Bessie Laskey, 22 T.C. 13 (1954).
'See cases cited note 38 supra.
"'Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
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in a divorce settlement, the situation is analogous to a transfer of ac-
counts receivable. In Herring v. Blakely,6 the Texas Supreme Court
held that vested interests in employee profit-sharing and group en-
dowment plans are considered to be property under Texas law and
thus comprise part of the community estate at the time of the di-
vorce. If the whole of the proceeds from the plan are set aside to the
husband and the division is taxable, the wife is said to have sold or
exchanged her community interest in the plan and as a result has
realized ordinary income in an amount equal to one-half of the value
of the plan at the time of the division." In such case the husband
obtains a new basis for the wife's community interest equal to that
amount. In the case of a nontaxable division, the wife's transfer of her
community interest is an assignment of income and one-half of the
amounts credited to the plan at the time of the division will be taxable
to the wife in the year the amounts are distributed to the husband."
It usually will be advisable to divide this account equally as between
the spouses, thereby splitting the income, instead of setting aside the
entire account to one spouse. To accomplish this the account could be
put in trust so that when withdrawals are made the wife will be paid
one-half of all amounts credited to the account at the time of the
divorce. Under such an arrangement the proceeds will be taxed to
each spouse either as ordinary income" or as capital gain," depending
upon the manner in which such proceeds are received."'
Life Insurance. The family often owns insurance policies on the
life of the husband, for which premiums have been paid from com-
munity funds. If such policies are set aside to the wife in a taxable
division, the husband has sold or exchanged his community interest
in the policies and will realize gain equal to one-half of the difference
between the cash surrender value and the total premiums paid at the
time of the division, if any." The wife would obtain a new basis for
the husband's interest equal to one-half of the cash surrender value
at the time of the transfer." On the other hand, in a nontaxable
division there would be no gain to the husband and the basis of the
56385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965).
57 Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958). See also note 53 supra.
58 See note 5 5 supra.
59 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(a) (1), 72; Treas. Reg. § 1.402 (a)-I (a) (1) (1956).
60 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 402(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-I (a) (6) (1956).
61 See Hughes, Community-Property Aspects of Profit-Sharing and Pension Plans in Texas
-Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelines for the Future, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 860
(1966).
62INt. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 72(e) (1) (B).
6 3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 72(g) (1).
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policy in the hands of the wife would be the amount of the total
premiums paid."
An even greater danger than the possible taxability of the transfer
of insurance policies at the time of divorce is the possible taxability
of proceeds at the death of the insured. Where life insurance has been
transferred for a valuable consideration, as in a taxable division of
community property, the proceeds paid by reason of the death of the
insured in excess of the payee's basis in the policy are subject to tax
as ordinary income.65 A different result would occur, however, if the
property division were nontaxable--or if the policy were allotted to
the insured 6 6 -inasmuch as there would be no sale or exchange of
the policy. In such cases the general rule exempting insurance paid
by reason of the death of the insured applies."7
The safest practice is to assign each policy to the spouse on whose
life the insurance is carried and adjust with other property the com-
munity interest in the cash surrender values between the parties. If
a policy must be partitioned, it should be surrendered to the insurance
company and exchanged for two equal policies, one to be set aside to
each spouse as his or her separate property. No gain will result to
either spouse in this situation and the "transfer for value" rules will
not be applicable to make the proceeds of the policy taxable.
4. Planning the Property Settlement
In planning a property settlement agreement the attorney will have
to gather full information concerning the fair market value and tax
basis of each item of property. In attempting a nontaxable, equal
division of the community property, an attorney must make certain
that a division is equal as to valuation and to basis. Care should be
taken to insure that the settlement agreement appears to be a simple
division of community property rather than a type of purchase and
sale. Further, the agreement should state that both parties agree that
it is a fair and equitable division. This should be reinforced by a
court's decree approving the agreement and stating that the settle-
ment is fair, just, and equitable.
If the nature of the assets or the disposition of the parties is such
that an equal division of the community property is not possible, it
will behoove the attorney to exercise great care in planning and draft-
4INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 72(e) (1) (B). See Browerman, A Practical Approach to
Tax Problems in Divorce and Property Settlement Agreements, So. CALIF. TAX. INST. 753,
773 (1960).
Ts NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1 (b) (1) (1957).
TINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (2) (B); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(2) (1957).
67INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (1).
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ing the property settlement agreement in order to minimize the tax
consequence to his client. In such case, the property settlement agree-
ment should be divided into taxable and nontaxable segments. The
nontaxable segment should take the form of an in-kind exchange,
wherein the community property is equally divided to the extent per-
mitted. If possible, appreciated assets should be included in this seg-
ment of the agreement to avoid the possibility of tax on the appreci-
ation at the time of the divorce. Such items should be transferred to
that spouse most likely to be in the lower tax bracket following di-
vorce, inasmuch as such spouse can best afford to pay tax on the
appreciation at a subsequent disposition of the asset.
If excess cash is to be paid to the wife, the agreement should clear-
ly state that such payment represents her one-half interest in specific
property or properties being transferred to the husband. Preferably,
these properties should have fair market values approximately equal
to their respective bases. Thus, even though this segment of the di-
vision is taxable, no gain or loss will result to either spouse. Depreci-
ated property should be sold prior to the division and the proceeds
divided between the spouses or retained for disposition at a time un-
related to the divorce, in order that maximum tax benefit may be
realized from the loss. Likewise, property subject to the depreciation
allowance should not be transferred between the spouses until after
the final decree has been entered. Attention should also be given to
the tax treatment afforded accounts receivable, pension, profit-sharing
and stock bonus plans, and life insurance transferred pursuant to a
property settlement.
The attorney who becomes fully informed as to the fair market
value and basis of each asset, the relative strength and weakness of
his client's bargaining position, and the rules of taxation applicable
to the division of property pursuant to a divorce is in position to ne-
gotiate a property settlement favorable for his client, not only at the
time of the divorce but also after it has been through the taxing pro-
cess.
Child Support Where a divorce is granted and the parties have
children under eighteen years of age, it is the duty of the court to
make such orders regarding support as are appropriate to the best
interests of the children. 8 Where a decree or agreement specifically
designates that the husband make periodic payments for the support
of a minor child, such payments may not be deducted by the hus-
band and are not taxable to the mother or child."' However, the de-
8 8 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4639a (1961).
"' TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1 (e) (1957).
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pendency exemption will still be available to the husband if he pro-
vides more than one-half of the support for such child." If the hus-
band makes payments for the support of an adult child which he has
no legal obligation to support, or if support payments are made be-
yond a child's reasonable needs, the husband exceeds his legal obliga-
tion to support the child. Such payments, therefore, constitute tax-
able gifts.7
The net economic burden upon the husband will be reduced if he
can obtain an income tax deduction for support payments made in
behalf of his children. On the other hand, the net amount available
to the wife to be used for support of her children will be reduced
should she be required to report such sums as taxable income. Never-
theless, an overall tax saving to the original family unit can be ef-
fected by obtaining just such a result, if after divorce the husband is in
a higher tax bracket than the wife. This result can be obtained when
the payments are for the support of the wife as well as for the chil-
dren, so long as the agreement or decree does not fix the amount of
child support, and so long as the payment qualifies under the ali-
mony rules. The United States Supreme Court in Commissioner v.
Lester"5 ruled that an agreement or decree does not "fix" the amount
of the child support unless it specifies a sum certain or a fixed percent-
age of the payment as being for the support of the children. Such an
agreement or decree granting support payments for the wife and
children may even provide for reduction in payments to the wife
upon a child's death, his marriage, or his reaching majority, without
being deemed to have fixed the amount due as child support." To
assure the desired tax consequence, the agreement should be drafted
in such a manner as to give the wife absolute control and ownership
of the payments, so that she supports the children from her own
funds and not from any particular portion of the funds received
from the husband.
The parties may share this tax saving by increasing the support
payments in an amount which will give the wife a larger sum after
taxes than the husband otherwise would have been willing to pay. In
such an arrangement, the husband will forego any possibility of ob-
taining the dependency exemptions for the children, but he will
70 See note 20 supra.
"'Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953). See generally Beck & Ek-
man, here Does Support End and Taxable Gift Begin?, N.Y.U. 23D INST. ON FED. TAX
1181 (1965).




usually find that the deduction of the support payments more than
offsets any loss.
Alimony Payments made to a divorced or legally separated wife
pursuant to a written agreement executed incident to the divorce or
separation, which constitute periodic alimony payments under tax
law, are deductible by the husband74 and taxable to the wife.7" Under
Texas law, however, a divorce court has no jurisdiction to provide per-
manent alimony."0 The court instead is empowered to make such
division of the property as to it seems just and equitable including,
if the circumstances warrant, awarding more than one-half of the
property to one of the spouses.7" The court may even require one
spouse to turn over his separate personal property to the other in a
particular case."s It is in this manner that Texas law provides for sup-
port of the wife following divorce.'
Despite the prohibition under local law, many couples still seek,
by way of permanent alimony, to achieve some of the income-split-
ting benefits they previously enjoyed through the filing of a joint
return. Such an arrangement may be attractive for a wife, if the
husband is otherwise financially reliable, in that the periodic pay-
ments provide financial security for her. The husband might like-
wise agree to an alimony arrangement in order to conserve his capi-
tal or to secure his business. The arrangement may even allow him to
pay a larger total sum to the wife because of the resulting tax sav-
ing.
If the parties desire to use the alimony arrangement, it is possible
to draft a provision that will include periodic payments for the wife
which qualify under the tax law and yet do not represent prohibited
alimony under the state law. This results from the code's being
phrased in terms of periodic payments made "because of the marital
or family relationship," which is broader than, but still encompasses,
alimony and support payments. However, even if the provision in an
"4INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 215. Should a husband, obligated to make alimony pay-
ments to his first wife, remarry and make such payments from community funds belonging
to himself and the second wife, such payments may be deducted by the husband and second
wife for income tax purposes. Robert A. Sharon, 10 T.C. 1177 (1948).
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the
body of law governing the determination payments qualifying as alimony under the tax law.
See however Wren, Tax Problems Incident to Divorce and Property Settlement, 49 CALIF.
L. REV. 665 (1961); and RUDICK, TAX CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE AND ITS TERMINA-
TiON (Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the ALI and ABA, 1964).
76 See note 24 supra.
7 7
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4638 (1948).
78 A court cannot compel a spouse to convey his or her separate real estate to the other
spouse, but can award the community real estate to one of the spouses. TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4638; Halley v. Halley, 331 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1960); Hedtke v. Hedtke,
112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21 (1923); Grant v. Grant, 351 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).79 Pickett v. Pickett, 401 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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agreement or decree requiring periodic payments for the support of
the wife is completely unenforceable under controlling state law,
alimony treatment is still available under tax law if the payments are
in fact made and qualify in all other respects. " The agreement should
clearly demonstrate the intent of the parties to obtain for themselves
the benefits of the alimony provisions of the code, without actually
using the word "alimony." This can be done by specifying that the
payments shall be made for the wife's support and shall be in addition
to her portion of the community property, not in lieu thereof. These
support payments and the property settlement provisions should be
stated separately to forestall the commissioner's argument that the
payments represent installments on the purchase price paid by the
husband for a portion of the wife's share of the community property.
Finally, the draftsman must carefully check the provisions of the
code as well as the language of pertinent cases when preparing an
agreement of this sort."'
If an alimony arrangement is employed, a trust or annuity plan can
provide security for the wife. However, if the husband establishes a
trust from which to make periodic payments to his wife he loses the
deduction for the payments made,' and the wife still must include
such trust payments in her gross income."3 Likewise, when an annu-
ity is used to discharge an alimony obligation the husband receives no
deduction for the annuity payment." The income of the trust or the
annuity is not included in the husband's gross income; however, this
factor is more than offset by his loss of deduction for the payments
made, to the extent that they are made out of principal. On the other
hand, the wife must include in her income the full amount of the pay-
ment received, whether paid out of principal or income." Thus, the
8 Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964).
81See Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955); Greer v. Scofield, 89 F. Supp.
75 (W.D. Tex. 1950), aff'd, 185 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1950); Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361
(1949); McElreath v. McElreath, 345 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1961); McBean v. McBean, 371
S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Lodge v. Lodge, 368 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963); Bunker v. Bunker, 336 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Graham v. Graham,
331 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Wilmeth v. Wilmeth, 311 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958); Wilson v. Woolf, 274 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); McBride v. McBride,
256 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).82Treas. Reg. § 1.215-1(b) (1957).
83iNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a). Section 682(a) applies to trusts created before
the divorce or separation and yet not in contemplation of such event.
4 See note 82 supra.
"STreas. Reg. § 1.71-1(c) (2) (1957). If alimony payments are made to the wife from
a S 682 trust, they need be included in her income only to the extent that such amounts




use of a trust or annuity as a device for making alimony payments is
not ordinarily desirable from the tax standpoint.
8 6
If a straight alimony arrangement is used, the husband can avoid
the above tax problems by making the payments out of current in-
come; however, this method provides no assurance to the wife that the
payments will be made. An alternative is an escrow arrangement,
which can provide the same security without the corresponding tax
disadvantages inherent in a trust or annuity. The husband may place
securities in an escrow account, pursuant to an agreement, and re-
ceive the income therefrom so long as he is not in default in his ali-
mony payments. At the end of the term for which alimony is to be
paid, the escrow agreement terminates and the securities are returned
to the husband. The agreement could provide that the husband be
permitted to withdraw securities annually from the escrow account
in an amount equal to the periodic payments he has made for that
year. The husband may take his deduction for alimony so long as he
makes the required payments, and escrow funds can be available for
the wife in case of default.
The Gift and Estate Tax Prior to the enactment of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 the practitioner sometimes encountered gift
tax problems in effecting certain types of property transfers incident
to a divorce. These problems centered around whether such transfers
were made for a valuable consideration in money or money's worth,
and the corpus of case law dealing with the subject provided no clear
guidelines. However, in 1954 the promulgation of section 2516 made
clear that the gift tax was not intended to apply to transfers of this
type. It is now undisputed that when a husband and wife enter into
a written agreement setting their marital and property rights and a
divorce occurs within two years thereafter, whether or not such
agreement has been approved by the divorce decree, any transfers
made between the spouses pursuant to such agreement, or made for
the reasonable support of minor children, are deemed to be made
for adequate consideration in money or money's worth, and are not
taxable gifts. s7
There is no comparable provision in the estate tax sections of the
code. It has been held that an obligation incurred under a marital
" Frequently, the husband continues to make the premium payments on an insurance
policy on his life for the wife's benefit. Such payments may qualify as alimony, otherwise
meeting the requirements of the code, if all incidents of ownership in the policies are irre-
vocably assigned to the wife and she is made the sole beneficiary. I.T. 4001, 1950-1 Cum.
BULL. 27. However, as previously pointed out, serious income tax consequences can arise
from the assignment of an insurance policy in a taxable divorce settlement.
8 T INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2516.
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settlement agreement-though not approved by the divorce decree-
was not incurred for a valuable consideration and thus would not be
deductible for estate tax purposes under section 2053 of the code."8
However, an argument was not made in these cases that the obligation
was incurred in purchase of the wife's share of community property
in a taxable transaction. In Texas the wife's property rights are vested
rights, and an obligation incurred by the husband in a property set-
tlement through purchase of these rights presumably should be in-
curred for a valuable consideration, thereby permitting the husband
a deduction for purposes of estate tax. However, all doubt upon the
subject can be resolved if the divorce decree approves the settlement
agreement. 9 Further, where such result is intended, the agreement
should specifically state that the obligation is to be binding on the
husband's estate.
Where claim is made against the husband's estate for alimony pay-
ments (and the agreement has been approved by the divorce decree
to insure deductibility of the claim), the husband's personal repre-
sentative may deduct the present value of future payments as a claim
on the estate tax return."° Also, if such payments are made out of
income of the estate, he may deduct the payment when made on the
income tax return of the estate.91 A recent Texas case has held that
the decedent husband's estate can be held liable on a theory of con-
tractual debt for amounts accruing after his death by virtue of a
written agreement for child support payments which has been con-
firmed and adopted by the divorce decree." Thus, the personal rep-
resentative also may deduct the present value of future child support
payments as a claim against the estate."
It is unlikely that any property transferred pursuant to a settle-
ment agreement would be included in the gross estate of the trans-
feror as having been made in contemplation of death, inasmuch as
divorce may be granted a lifetime motive."
III. POST-DIVORCE
Filing Returns and Liability for Tax The problems encountered in
88Rogan v. Riggle, 128 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1942); Estate of Chester H. Bowers, 23
T.C. 911 (1955).
89 Rev. Rul. 60-160, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 374, modifying E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BULL.
166.
'Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946).
"' Laughlin's Estate v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1948).
82 Hutchings v. Bates, 393 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), aff'd, 9 Tex. Sup. Ct. 1.
530 '(1966).
93 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2053; Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4 (1958).
"
4 Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(c) (1958).
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filing returns and in determining liability for income tax for the
year in which a divorce is granted are similar to those which must be
faced while the divorce is pending, with the exception that a joint
return cannot be filed. Since the community property rules continue
to apply until the date of final decree, each spouse must report on a
separate return one-half of the community income from the first
day of the tax year to the effective date of divorce in addition to
reporting separate income for the balance of the year. This point is
often overlooked in drafting settlement agreements, and it is quite
difficult to explain to the parties subsequent to the divorce, particular-
ly when such explanation is necessitated by actions of the tax collector.
Provision should be made whereby the husband agrees to supply his
divorced wife with information necessary for reporting her share
of the community income, including, where applicable, receivables
and pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus payments accruing after
the final decree. Likewise, the agreement should specify which party
has the obligation to pay tax on such income as well as the respon-
sibility for any deficiency. It should also require an escrow of funds
sufficient to cover any potential liability. Even though such provi-
sions in the settlement agreement or decree are not binding on the
Internal Revenue Service,"s the parties will have thereby an oppor-
tunity to adjust between themselves any inequities brought about by
application of the tax law and to ensure relief and/or protection from
such inequities while they still are in a bargaining position.
Exemption for Children In an arrangement whereby the husband
is to make payments for support of his minor children following di-
vorce, the question often arises as to which parent is entitled to the
dependency exemptions. The so-called "over fifty per cent" test is
again controlling and governs the allowance of the exemption despite
contrary recitals in the agreement or decree." In a situation where
the husband, wife, and a third party all contribute to the support of
the children, the parties may enter into a multiple support agree-
ment among themselves for claiming the respective dependency ex-
emptions."'
In determining the amount of support furnished, expenditures for
food, shelter, clothing, medical and dental care, and education, are
considered; however, it is not necessary that these items be furnished
in cash." Items furnished in kind are included in the computation
of support at their fair value. Unless the divorce decree provides
95 See note 17 supra.
"Delbert D. Bauner, 39 T.C. 534 (1962); see note 20 supra.
9
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 152(c).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2) (1957).
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designated amounts for each child, support payments are divided
equally among all of the children.99 However, it should be noted that
the husband is entitled to use the total amount of child support pay-
ments made by him during the taxable year in determining whether
he furnished more than fifty per cent of the support, whether or not
such payments are actually used in support of the child."° The bur-
den is on the taxpayer claiming such exemption to establish the total
support furnished the dependent and not merely his part thereof.1 '
This requirement can be disadvantageous to the husband who is mak-
ing child support payments for children in the custody of the wife.
Hence, it may be advisable to require the wife to furnish to the hus-
band annual statements for her expenditures in support of the chil-
dren in her custody in order that the husband may have some basis
on which to determine whether he is entitled to the exemptions in a
particular year. On the other hand, after the divorce the wife too
will be interested in qualifying for the lower head of the household
rate. 0 2
Attorney's Fees The deductibility of attorney's fees as a business or
non-business expense depends upon the type of legal work done in
consideration therefor. Fees are fully deductible under the following
sections of the code if:
(1) it is an ordinary and necessary business expense (section 162);
(2) it is an expense arising out of the production or collection of
non-business income (section 212 (1 ) ) ;
(3) it is an expense for the management, conservation or main-
tenance of property held for production of income (section
212 (2)); or,
(4) it is an expense in connection with tax advice (section
212(3)).
In addition, the attorney's fee must also be: ordinary, necessary, and
reasonable; paid or incurred in the tax year; an expense rather than
a capital expenditure; and, non-personal in nature.'
The nature of a divorce action precludes the applicability of sec-
tion 162 to attorney's fees. Further, section 262 disallows any deduc-
tion for personal expenses, the regulations thereunder providing:
"Generally, attorney's fees and other costs paid in connection with a
"Ollie J. Kotlowski, 10 T.C. 533 (1948); YouR FEDERAL INCOME TAX, at 20 (1964
ed.).
'O°T.T. 3883, 1947-2 CUM. BULL. 38.
'0' Frank P. Gajda, 44 T.C. 783 (1965); Aaron F. Vance, 36 T.C. 547 (1961); Bernard
C. Rivers, 33 T.C. 935 (1960).
102 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 1 (b) (2).
'03INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 162, 212; Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(a) (1957).
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divorce, separation or decree for support are non-deductible by either
the husband or the wife.""' However, some attorney's fees in connec-
tion with a divorce action can be deducted under section 212,'0" even
though the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Davis, °8
United States v. Gilmore,'7 and United States v. Patrick' severely
restricted the application of this section. In both Gilmore and Patrick,
the taxpayers sought current deductions for their legal fees on the
ground that they were incurred for the conservation of property held
for the production of income. ' The Supreme Court denied the de-
duction in both cases, stating that the origin of the claim controls its
consequences to the taxpayer and determines its deductibility for tax
purposes. The Court held that only the cost of resisting claims aris-
ing in connection with business or profit-seeking activities are de-
ductible. That the claims originated in divorce actions, and therefore
were personal in nature, precluded a current deduction under section
212(2).
In the Gilmore case the taxpayer had argued in the alternative that
if the attorney's fees were not a current deduction they should be
treated as a capital expenditure and added to his basis in the prop-
erty. The taxpayer, following the Supreme Court's disposition of the
Gilmore case, pursued this theory in the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of California."0 In deciding the issue that court
held that the legal cost of protecting the husband's interest in stock
in a divorce settlement was a capital expenditure. This decision fol-
lows the general rule that capitalization is required for legal fees in-
curred to acquire property (other than property includable in cur-
rent income) as well as those incurred in protecting the property
from adverse claims."' The personal nature of an expenditure is not
relevant to the test for its capitalization. If such costs are allowed to
be capitalized and added to the basis of the property interest protect-
ed, the taxpayer can recoup these costs through the depreciation al-
lowance or by utilization of the increased basis upon ultimate dis-
position of the property.
The decisions in Gilmore and Patrick do not seem to have affected
the deductibility by the wife under section 212 (1) of that portion
'04Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (7) (1958).
'O"Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Ruth K. Wild, 42 T.C.
706 (1964); Gale v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), aff'd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951).
'06370 U.S. 65 (1962).
107372 U.S. 39 (1963).
108372 U.S. 53 (1963).
'0I INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(2).
"Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
"' Shipp v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1954).
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of her attorney's fees expended to secure alimony in a divorce ac-
tion," to increase the amount of alimony subsequent to the divorce,'
13
or to collect alimony in arrears."4 In these instances the wife is seek-
ing to obtain new income that will be taxed to her. The "origin of
the claim" test appears to apply only to section 212 (2).
Section 212 (3) permits the current deduction of attorney's fees
for tax advice rendered. Even though the propriety of such a deduc-
tion was questioned in the Davis case, the Supreme Court did not
pass on the deductibility of a fee paid by the taxpayer to his own tax
counsel. However, the Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled
to a deduction under this section for the attorney's fees paid to the
wife's tax counsel. In a subsequent case in the United States Court of
Claims-the same court that originally heard the Davis casen -a
deduction was allowed under section 212 (3) for tax advice given
pursuant to the divorce."' In order for the taxpayer to be able to
deduct any portion of his attorney's fees it is essential that the re-
tained attorney keep full and detailed records of his time spent and
work done in connection with the divorce. Such records will enable
the attorney to present to his client an itemized statement of services
rendered, indicating which portions of his fee, if any, can be deducted
or capitalized. Finally, each spouse should pay his or her own at-
torney.
IV. CONCLUSION
Income tax consequences are inherent in any divorce, regardless of
the amount of property involved. Thus, it is incumbent upon counsel
for both parties to make every effort to minimize the tax liability and
eliminate potential problems for their clients. Informed planning
during the pre-divorce stage and employment of the settlement
agreement will help to accomplish these objectives. Careful drafting
of the settlement agreement is essential. Through awareness of the tax
rules applicable to divorce the attorney can prevent his client's mari-
tal problems from being compounded following divorce by unex-
pected and unintended tax consequences.
'.. Ruth K. Wild, 42 T.C. 706 (1964).
"s Gale v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), aff'd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cit. 1951).
4 See note 104 supra.
"' Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
1"'Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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